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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses the influence of a new regulatory framework (approved in 2010) concerning 
strategic management in the Flemish municipalities. Particularly, the paper’s focus is on the impact 
of the introduction of the policy and management cycle on the management team’s (MT) role in 
the formulation, execution and evaluation of local policy. The empirical analysis is mainly based on 
two surveys performed in 2008 and 2013 among municipal secretaries. Statistical regression 
analysis suggests the varying implementation and use of this new regulatory framework has an 
important influence on the role MT’s play in the policy cycle. MT’s play a more important role in 
the municipal policy cycle when more policy goals are formulated. Also the involvement of the 
MT’s members in preparing the strategic multi-annual budgets is of importance. In sum, the added 
variables concerning strategic management in 2013 affords a model with far greater explanatory 
power. Furthermore, the MT’s role depends on the prevailing organizational culture: in 
municipalities where heads of department and the mayor and college of aldermen cooperate on 
equal basis and where the note of agreement between MT and college is considered more 
important, MT’s have more influence. By contrast, the municipal context variables have a far less 
explanatory power.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Throughout Europe a wind of political and institutional change seems to be blowing through municipalities”
 
. 
Steyvers et al (2005:11) 
Since the 1980s, many European local governments have seen fundamental changes in their 
institutional setting through territorial and organizational reforms (i.a. Caulfield & Larsen, 2002; 
Vetter & Kersting, 2003; Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2011). Literature distinguishes between political 
and administrative reforms. Especially the latter are often considered under the umbrella of New 
Public Management (NPM) (Caulfield & Larsen, 2002). In order to improve the efficient and effective 
functioning of public authorities, most NPM-reforms apply private sector styles, insights and 
techniques (Hood, 1995; Liegl, 2001). Also the Flemish Municipal Decree for Flemish Local 
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municipalities of which most articles came into force in 2007 is to some extent inspired by New 
Public Management ideas: secretaries and treasurers formally became local top managers, a note of 
agreement was introduced to enhance political administrative relations, systems of internal control 
were implemented, together with renewed legal status regulations. These are just a few examples of 
NPM-inspired reforms set out by the decree (De Rynck & Wayenberg, 2013). In this paper the 
interference between two major management reforms is explored: (1) the introduction of local MT’s 
and (2) the modernization of the municipal policy and management cycle (PMC). More specifically, 
this paper examines and declares the MT’s role in the local policy cycle.  
Evidence for the interference of these two management innovations can be found both in regulation 
and in literature. The Municipal Decree explicitly confirms the essential role that the administration 
and the MT should play in the management cycle in the preparation, execution and evaluation of 
policy: “the MT supports the coordination of municipal services and under the instructions of 
secretary, the body determines the content of policy in the multi-annual budgets”.1 Since the new 
regulatory framework of 2010 on strategic management and the policy and management cycle (PMC-
Order) radically changes the lay-out and content of these (multi-) annual plans and budgets by 
integrating policy and financial planning, it can be assumed that the MT’s role in this planning 
process is becoming increasingly significant. Weets (2012) subscribes this presumption and states 
that MT’s probably will serve as hubs in the modernized and integrated planning and budgeting 
activities. A recent survey of Bleyen and Bouckaert (2014) within municipalities and public centers of 
social welfare reveals a relatively high level of involvement of MT members in the preparation of the 
(multi-) annual plans and budgets in accordance with the new rules. Moyersons et al (2012) add that 
the MT’s role goes beyond the straightforward preparation of plans and budgets. These authors also 
ascribe a major role to the MT’s in the more general project planning that comes along with the 
implementation of the regulatory framework of 2010. 
In the following paragraphs, we cover the underlying theoretical approach of this paper as well as 
some insights in the background of the reforms. Subsequently we discuss how the MT’s role in the 
policy cycle and each of the explanatory variables will be set up and operationalized. After having 
explained data collection, the results of our regression model are presented and main conclusions 
are drawn.  
 
REFORMS FROM A NEW INSTITUTIONALISTS PERSPECTIVE 
Reforms and innovations such as those initiated by the Municipal Decree need to be evaluated. It is 
important to examine whether actual changes in organizational functioning fit the intended goals. 
New institutionalism approaches are appropriate frameworks to address such institutional 
evaluations, because they consider institutions more broadly than traditional institutionalists do 
(Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2011). According to this new institutionalism, the legalistic, normative and 
structural features of a formal innovation are not decisive for organizational change. In this 
approach, more importance is attached to the role of organizational standards, values and routines 
(i.a. Selznick, 1996; Hall & Taylor, 1996; March & Olson, 1984). To put it differently, new 
institutionalism assumes that “the organization of political life makes a difference” (March & Olson, 
1984:747). Similarly, some authors contend that organizations are embedded in a social and political 
                                                          
1 Art. 98, Municipal Decree. 
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environment in which actual practices result from underlying prevailing rules, conventions and 
beliefs, such as conflicting values and power relations, informal structures and embedded routines 
(Meyer, John & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Rather than focusing on the extent to which 
change of regulations paves the way to convergence between organizations, new institutionalism 
acknowledges mechanisms that lead to organizational heterogeneity (Lounsbury, 2008). In this paper 
institutional change is defined as a “contingent and context dependent process, rather than 
something that can be imposed from the outside through formal mechanisms alone” (Leach & 
Lowndes, 2007:199). As such, to explain the MT’s role in the municipal policy cycle, the focus needs 
to be shifted from formal legal regulations to “the informal conventions of political life” (Lowndes, 
2010:71).  
To operationalize these theoretical assumptions and to explain the MT’s role, this paper distinguishes 
between mediating meso and micro variables. Following Hall and Taylor (1996), Lowndes and 
Roberts (2013) and Gorges (2001), the examined explanatory variables are based on three 
approaches: historical, sociological and rational choice institutionalism (cf. infra). Meso variables 
include organizational routines and standards and other contextual factors as political stability in and 
the financial and socio-economic profile of municipalities. Micro variables conversely refer to 
characteristics of the individuals within an organization – i.c. the municipal secretaries –  and choices 
made by those individuals “in being aware of, accepting and acting to the content of the reform” 
(Steyvers, Reynaert & Block, 2010:13). Figure 1 summarizes the applied research design. 
Figure 1. Applied explorative research design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although new institutionalists emphasize the importance of informal conventions, they do not 
neglect the formal architecture to which institutions are bound. After all, this formal framework 
shapes municipal activities and stipulates the limits within which these activities take place (Lowndes 
& Roberts, 2013). As a consequence we provide a brief overview of the legislative framework that 
underpins the implementation of the municipal MT’s and the modernization of the policy and 
management cycle.  
 
INTRODUCTION OF THE MANAGEMENT TEAM 
In 2007, the Municipal Decree obliged local governments to install a management team. An MT can 
be defined “as a group of managers at the same organizational level who are a part of the 
organizations formal management structure” (McIntyre, 1998). However, this description is only 
partly applicable to Flemish local governments since only the secretary, the treasurer, the deputy 
secretary (if applicable) and the mayor (or a designated alderman) with an advisory vote are obliged 
Meso 
- Municipal context 
- Organizational culture 
Micro 
- Characteristics of the Secretary 
Role of the MT  
in the municipal policy cycle 
Explanatory variables                             Dependent variable 
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to take part of the MT. The municipal council is entitled to appoint additional members and/or to 
remove them from office.2 
The introduction of the MT implies that the internal organization of the municipal administrations 
changes significantly. Particularly, the MT facilitates collaboration between the municipal secretary 
and treasurer. Besides, the Municipal Decree clarifies the division of tasks between both 
administrators and explicitly appoints the secretary head of the municipality’s administration at the 
expense of the treasurer. The Explanatory Memorandum of the Municipal Decree states that “the 
inner conflict between secretary and treasurer has been largely substituted for a model in which 
collaboration is facilitated and where both secretary and treasurer are charged with important 
tasks”.3   
The MT is involved in decision making procedures concerning the organizational structure, the legal 
position of civil servants and workforce issues. The MT supports and coordinates the municipal 
departments in carrying out the policy formulation, execution and evaluation and is involved in the 
preparation of the preliminary draft of the strategic (multi-) annual plans and budgets.4 In addition, 
the MT has to maintain the uniformity and quality of the municipal services and is responsible to 
streamline internal communication.5 More specifically, the secretary is obliged to determine a 
system of internal control in consultation with the MT.6 Furthermore, cooperation between the MT 
and the college of aldermen has been formalized by means of a note of agreement which is drawn up 
after the renewal of the municipal council.7  
This paper considers the introduction of MT’s in the Flemish local governments as an externalization 
of two of Hood’s (1991) NPM-doctrines in the context of the Flemish municipalities: the reform leads 
to an increase of the sense of responsibility of the top management and to a shift towards private 
sector management techniques. Nevertheless this reform cannot be considered as a completely new 
one: research in this respect shows that a form of MT already existed in 56 percent of all 308 
municipalities before the formal obligation in 2007. Nevertheless, the impact of the body remained 
limited due to a lack of leadership. Another operating point was the lack of embeddedness of the MT 
in the municipal administration (Olislagers et al, 2009). Vallet and De Rynck (2006) refer to the 
novelty of a local MT as a possible explanation for this trend. This assumption is strengthened by the 
finding that MT’s were evaluated more positive in municipalities that already introduced a form of 
MT before the legal obligation of the Municipal Decree in 2007. By the summer of 2008, 97% of all 
municipalities installed an MT (Olislagers et al, 2009). Despite the limited impact of the MT at the 
time, secretaries were generally favorable to the innovation in the first months after the 
implementation (Steyvers et al, 2010). 
 
MODERNIZATION OF THE POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CYCLE 
As citizens increasingly expect governments to formulate clear policy goals and to take responsibility 
for the realization of these goals, strategic management has been introduced in the public sector to 
meet these demands (Conings, 2011). Strategic management is more than writing policy plans, it is 
                                                          
2 Art. 96, Municipal Decree.   
3 Flemish Government, Explanatory Memorandum added to the Municipal Decree, Flemish Parliament 2004-2005, n. 347/1.  
4 Art. 87, 93, 96 & 98, Municipal Decree.   
5 Art. 96 & 98, Municipal Decree.  
6 Art. 100, Municipal Decree. 
7 Art. 87, Municipal Decree. 
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also about organizations that steer budgets, human resources, performance measurement, etc., 
based on a long-term accepted strategic agenda that is implemented in a purposeful way (Poister & 
Streib, 1999). As the budget ideally facilitates this policy role in all phases of the budget cycle, it 
should be regarded as one of the most important policy documents (Diamond, 2013). The PMC-
Order which was approved in 2010 encourages this long term policy planning and strategic 
management in the Flemish local governments. To this end, adjusted policy planning, execution and 
evaluation procedures were introduced to integrate performance information in the financial cycle. 
Long term policy planning for the duration of the legislative period became one of the basic 
principles together with the linkage of policy intentions to the available financial leeway. Strategic 
long term planning replaced the annual budget as the starting point for the municipal policy and 
management cycle8: “the mere enumeration of estimated revenues and expenditure needs to be 
replaced for overall strategic multi-annual planning in which the focus is moved from allocated 
resources to municipal policy goals”.9  
Although these substantive rules were already included in the Municipal Decree (2007), they were 
only systematically mandatory introduced in all 308 municipalities after the implementation of the 
PMC-Order, particularly between 2011 and 2014.10 In the meantime (2007-2010), some 
municipalities already started with the implementation of some elements of the reform, either by 
drawing up a sort of interim long term ‘general policy program’ and annual policy note11, or in a later 
stage by starting up a PMC pilot project.12 The annual policy notes of the former municipalities need 
to be seen as plans in which old budget classifications were combined with policy content structured 
according to the guidelines of the Municipal Decree. In practice, 28 percent of the surveyed 
treasurers did not appear to have an annual policy note in which policy objectives have been 
formulated in 2008 (Weets, 2012). More recent findings show that 63,2 percent of the municipalities 
(pilot projects excluded) did not manage to formulate any policy goals in their 2013 policy report 
underlying the budget (Bleyen & Bouckaert, 2014).  
From 2014 onwards, municipalities must prepare long term policy by establishing a strategic note 
within their multi-annual budgets. The policy intentions included in these budgets further need to be 
made concrete in an annual policy report within the budget.13 In practice, the PMC-Order stipulates 
that policy goals and underlying action plans and actions need to be formulated in the strategic note 
(long term) and the policy note (short term).14 Each policy objective ideally should demonstrate (1) 
the targets that must be accomplished, (2) the undertakings in order to accomplish these targets and 
(3) the budgetary implications of these targets.15 Further, a twofold division is made between priority 
policy objectives and other policy objectives. Only priority objectives need to be submitted explicitly 
to the municipal council, the other objectives are subject to internal monitoring, for example within 
the MT. Technically, resources are allocated at the level of the municipal actions. Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
8 Flemish Government, Explanatory Memorandum added to the Municipal Decree, Flemish Parliament 2004-2005, n. 347/1. 
9 Circular BB 2013/4. Strategic multi annual planning (multi annual plan 2014-2019) and budgeting (budget 2014) according to the policy 
and management cycle, 30 April 2013, 25834.  
10 Circular ABB 2006/19 of 1 December 2006 on the Order of the Flemish Government of 24 November 2006 on the introduction of some 
provisions of the Municipal Decree of 15 July 2005 and on the implementation of art. 160 and 179 of the Municipal Decree of 15 July 2005, 
10 January 2007, 901-918.  
11 Circular BB 2007/07. Instructions on the preparation of budgets and multi annual plans of 2008 in municipalities and PCSW’s, 28 August 
2007, 44690; Art. 242bis, New Municipal Code. 
12 12 municipalities started to implement the PMC Order in 2011, 22 municipalities in 2013 and 85 in 2013.  
13 Art. 146-157, Municipal Decree; art. 11 and 16, PMC Order.  
14 Art. 6, PMC Order  
15 Report to the Flemish Government added by the PMC Order, 10/0705/0382. 
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report added to the PMC-Order clearly states that it is not desirable to translate all activities, 
revenues and expenditures into policy objectives.16 Regarding policy execution, accounting rules are 
renewed and the PMC-Order obliges the submission of quarterly financial reports to the Flemish 
government. Ideally, municipalities also implement procedures of internal interim financial and 
policy reporting.  
In the annual account, local governments must at least report to what extent priority policy 
objectives have been achieved. With respect to performance information in the (multi-) annual 
budgets, the PMC-Order also pays attention to performance measurement through performance 
measures: “wherever possible and useful results and effects must be made measurable in order to 
formulate policy goals correctly (planning phase), to introduce transparency with regard to the 
intended results during policy execution (implementation phase) and to evaluate the extent to which 
policy goals actually are achieved” (evaluation phase).17 Figure 2 offers a visualization of the renewed 
policy and management cycle in the Flemish local governments. 
Figure 2. The policy and management cycle in the Flemish municipalities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This second reform fits in with the internationally recognized trend of result-oriented financial 
management, trying to change the culture of budgeting radically from an input towards an output 
oriented control. The ‘traditional’ budget seems to be evolving into a budget with strategic policy 
objectives to which resources are linked (Curristine, 2005). More precisely the scope and purpose of 
the financial cycle is expanded due to the new planning, operational and performance procedures 
(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). This trend is inspired by three other NPM-doctrines of Hood (1991): the 
clear-cut measurement of targets and performance, highlighting output-oriented control and 
highlighting the effective, efficient and economical management of public goods. Olson et al (1998) 
label these reforms as New Public Financial Management. 
                                                          
16 Report to the Flemish Government added by the PMC Order, 10/0705/0382; Art. 13, PMC Order. 
17 Art. 13 & 18; PMC Order; Report to the Flemish Government added by the PMC Order, 10/0705/0382. 
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MESO EN MICRO VARIABLES 
Mindful of the outlined theoretical framework, this paper expects meso and micro variables to have 
an impact on the local MT’s actual strength and role. The attention for the meso level is rooted in 
historical institutionalism, which considers institutional development to be path dependent. Once 
policymakers have made policy decisions, future choices will be influenced by these earlier decisions. 
Change would prove difficult because of considerably high costs (Sanders, 2008). Sociological 
institutionalism also pays attention to the meso level, since this approach stresses the importance of 
culture, values and norms for institutional structures (Lowndes & Roberts, 2007; Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
Further, human activity would be determined by the context in which it is embedded (Goodin, 1996). 
Following Premfors (2004:16) “an agency is more context-driven than goal-driven and particularly 
influenced by cultural logics”. As such this paper analyzes a number of variables concerning the 
municipal context and organizational culture.  
The applied micro variables are based on rational choice institutionalism. According to this approach 
all local actors perform their duties with regard to self-interest: all strategic and purposive actions 
and activities are based on utility maximization (Lowndes & Roberts, 2007; Hall & Taylor, 1996). The 
recognition of explanatory micro variables is also rooted in sociological institutionalism. As Pierson 
(2000: 478) wrote: “in structuring institutional arrangements, actors may be motivated more by 
conceptions of what is appropriate than by conceptions of what would be effective”. Because the 
secretary is in charge of the general management of the municipality, some of his individual 
characteristics are added to the analysis in order to understand the explanatory power of these 
micro variables.18 Based on findings in the literature and a similar study of Hennau et al (2013), the 
next sections discus each of the variables and puts hypotheses forth. 
1. The Municipal context 
Based on a survey performed in 2008, Hennau et al (2013) conclude that the MT’s role correlates 
with political discontinuity (MC1): the MT’s influence was assessed to be more important in these 
municipalities where the 2006 elections led to an alternative majority. This finding has also been 
confirmed in another study: local innovations are more likely to be implemented in municipalities 
which have been subject to recent major political shifts (Steen & Wille, 2005). According to Weets 
(2012), the college of mayor and aldermen is more admissible for change when the majority of the 
college members lack political experience. 
Besides, the MT’s role was influenced in 2008 by the municipal financial prospects (MC2). In general, 
the MT’s role is more important in local governments with a financing surplus (Hennau et al, 2013). 
This conclusion is not supported by Weets (2012) and Vallet and De Rynck (2006), authors who state 
that Flemish municipalities with a financing surplus spend more money on managerial reforms. 
Despite this, we have chosen to put forth a hypothesis in line with the research results of Hennau et 
al (2013), because their approach gets closer to our research setting. However some adaptions are 
made to the operationalization of the variable (cf. infra).  
The municipal population (MC3) and the composition of the majority (MC4) are two other 
contextual factors that are taken into account. However not correlated to the MT’s role in 2008 
(Hennau et al, 2013), these variables are tested again because other findings in the literature suggest 
such a correlation. According to Steen and Wille (2005) more populated municipalities tend to see 
                                                          
18 Art. 86, Municipal Decree. 
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the challenges and benefits of local reforms more clearly. Plees and Laurent (1998) conclude that 
municipal scale (measured by population) and perceptions about inefficiency are correlated 
negatively. Moreover, scale has affected the implementation of the Municipal Decree (De Rynck et 
al, 2009). Finally, research in the Belgian municipalities shows that mayors of smaller municipalities 
are more involved with the municipal administration (Ackaert, 2006), which possibly also is related to 
the strength of municipalities. With regard to this, Weets (2012) suggests that an absolute majority is 
beneficial to the introduction of managerial reforms because of the higher confidence between the 
members of the college of mayor and aldermen.  
Table 1. The municipal context - hypotheses  
The MT plays a more significant role when … 
  MC1: … the most recent elections have led to an alternative majority; 
  MC2: … a municipality has good financial prospects; 
  MC3: … a municipality is more populated;  
  MC4: … one political party governs with an absolute majority of votes. 
 
2. The municipal organizational culture 
No doubt the introduction of the MT has led to changes in the municipalities’ organization chart 
(Demuzere & Molenveld, 2012; Jones & Stewart, 2012). As these reforms of the organizational 
structure tend to go together with changes in the organizational culture, Leach and Lowndes 
(2007:184) state that: “changes in formal arrangements are being interpreted on the ground through 
an institutional filter of beliefs, assumptions and practices that typically emphasize traditional values 
and ways of working”. Following Deal and Kennedy (1982), organizational culture can be defined as: 
“the way we do things around here, which is a matter of unwritten rules and implicit agreements; a 
stable but hidden system, a collection of values, symbols, heroes, rituals and stories that operate 
beneath the surface executing powerful influence in the behavior of the workplace”. Reasoning by 
means of analogies, Shields and Young (1989) describe organizational culture as a mode of thought 
of the employees in which shared beliefs, values and objectives are embedded. 
Even though informal rules often are conservative in nature in periods of transition (Leach & 
Lowndes, 2007), the Municipal Decree attempts to influence the organizational culture in at least 
two ways. First, the decree aims to alter the political-administrative set-up. Second, instruments and 
processes are provided in order to shift from an input- towards a more output-oriented model of 
steering and control. These aspects can be translated to and operationalized into a set of explanatory 
variables all referring to the municipal organizational culture.  
A. Politico-administrative culture 
With regard to the policy cycle, the administration and the MT are responsible in close cooperation 
with the political mandatories. More specifically, the Municipal Decree has the ambition to replace a 
strongly divided ‘aldermen model’ by a ‘management team model’ (OC1). While the college of 
mayor and aldermen dominates local decision making in the former model, the treasurer and heads 
of department are at the top of strategic decision making in the management team model. The MT is 
mend to collectively deliberate with the college of mayor and aldermen which still functions as the 
key decision maker. However, the college’s decisions are based on administrative preparatory 
policymaking preliminaries. Subsequently the MT is responsible for the execution of the decided 
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policy. This shift in responsibilities should end practices of aldermen’s direct steering of the 
departments (Vallet & De Rynck, 2007; Plees & De Leemans, 1997). Previous qualitative and 
quantitative research indicates that MT’s are stronger in municipalities where more characteristics of 
the management team model can be found. Also, the MT is judged more positively in these 
municipalities (i.a. Vallet & De Rynck, 2007; Hennau et al, 2013; Steyvers et al, 2010). 
The so called note of agreement (OC2) (cf. supra) is a second instrument meant to redefine political 
administrative relations. In order to improve the politico-administrative cooperation, this note 
formalizes politico-administrative cooperation and enables all those concerned to execute their 
delegated  competences. By compiling agreements on policy choices and the steering of the policy 
cycle in a formal document, both can be coordinated effectively.19 Previous research in this regard 
highlights a positive correlation between the importance attached by secretaries to the note of 
agreement and the ascribed role of the MT (Hennau et al, 2013; Steyvers et al, 2010). 
B. Result-oriented culture 
Due to the introduction of budget holders and the modernization of the PMC, result-oriented 
(financial) management is high on the agenda in Flemish municipalities (Cf. supra). The possibility to 
delegate budgets to the municipal secretary and/or other staff members increases these actors’ 
involvement in the policy cycle. Furthermore, Hennau et al (2013) conclude that the MT’s influence is 
estimated lower by secretaries defending a far-reaching delegation of budgets. As discussed in this 
paper, the introduction of result-oriented budgeting and strategic management has an influence on 
the MT’s role. For example, the Municipal Decree prescribes that the preliminary design of the 
strategic and financial note of the multi-annual budget is drawn up in consultation with the MT in 
order to guarantee the involvement of the municipalities’ different sections in the policy and budget 
preparation and execution (Beirens, 2011).20 Following Weets (2012) – who advanced the thesis that 
the MT could play an important role in the introduction of result-oriented reforms – we expect the 
MT’s role to be bigger in those municipalities where: 
- delegation of budgets is institutionalized (OC3); 
- the content of the (multi-) annual budgets is evaluated positively (OC4);  
- policy and management procedures are considered to be more result-oriented (OC5). This 
assumption is in line with Lencioni’s (2005) findings, who links inadequate attention for 
results to the MT’s malfunctioning in private and public organizations. 
 
Since the PMC-Order only came into force in January 2014, PMC related variables will only be 
considered for 2013. As a consequence, the net influence of these variables on the MT’s role in the 
policy cycle are mapped. Furthermore, the MT’s role is expected to be considered more important in 
those municipalities where the MT (OC6a) and the PMC-reform (OC6b) were introduced before legal 
obligation21 - as some municipalities have done (cf. supra). Although such an early start-up was often 
accompanied with difficulties and uncertainty (Vallet & De Rynck, 2007), one can assume greater 
enthusiasm and openness towards these reforms in these municipalities.22 Ultimately, the MT’s 
                                                          
19 Art. 87, Municipal Decree; Flemish Government, Explanatory Memorandum added to the Municipal Decree, Flemish Parliament 2004-
2005, n. 347/1. 
20 Art. 87 and 93, Municipal Decree. 
21 Olislagers et al. (2009) found a positive correlation between the perceptions about the MT and its years in operation.  
22 Also other possible motives are worth mentioning, like more education and support opportunities, less pressure of time during the 
implementation process, etc.  
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involvement in the realization of the present (strategic) multi-annual budget is included in the 
model (OC7). Different preceding studies consider the involvement of top administrators crucial 
during management reforms (i.a. Rothwell, 1994; Shields, 1995; Berman & Wang, 2000). As with 
most of the other variables, this organization culture’s characteristic is based upon the secretaries 
perceptions.  
Finally, Weets (2012) found a positive correlation between the perceptions of the instruments in line 
with NPM-ideas and the extent to which institutional reforms (i.c. the introduction or elements of 
result-oriented budgeting) were introduced. This conclusion reinforces our expectations concerning 
the different hypotheses, summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2. Hypotheses concerning the municipalities’ organization culture 
The MT’s role is considered more important as…  
OC1: … the organization of municipalities is streamlined according to the management team model; 
OC2: … the note of agreement is considered more important; 
OC3: … municipalities are more open towards the delegation of budgets;   
OC4: … the strategic multi-annual plan is evaluated positively;  
OC5: … policy planning is developed and result-oriented;  
OC6a: … the MT was introduced before legal obligation;  
OC6b: … the PMC-reform was introduced before legal obligation;  
OC7: … the MT’s involvement in the preparation of the multi-annual plan increases.  
 
C. Does the secretary make the difference? The influence of micro variables  
Preceding research already emphasized the importance of individual characteristics as the actors’ 
profile, their education and experience. The higher educated and less experienced secretaries are, 
the more positive they evaluated the MT (i.a. Plees & Laurent, 1998; Weets, 2012; Bäck, 2006). Our 
analysis takes two micro variables into consideration: the municipal secretaries’ experience in their 
function (ICS1) and their involvement in the realization of the strategic multi-annual budget (ICS2). 
We assume that strongly involved secretaries facilitate the MT’s role.  
Table 3. Hypotheses concerning the secretaries’ individual characteristics  
The MT’s role is considered more important as municipal secretaries:  
ICS1: … are less experienced; 
ICS2: … are more involved in the realization of the multi-annual budget.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALIZATION  
In order to investigate the influence of the discussed variables on the perceived strength of the 
Flemish municipalities’ MT’s, two regression analyses were executed based on survey data of 2008 
(postal) and 2013 (web-based). Both questionnaires were sent to all Flemish municipalities’ 
secretaries in the context of three research projects of the Policy Research Centre on Governmental 
Organization – Decisive Governance.23 Figure 2 gives an overview of both surveys’ response rates.   
                                                          
23 The concerned SBOV - research projects are: “Evaluation of the implementation of the local government act on administrative power of 
local government”; “Implementation of the ‘Policy and Management Cycle’ in local government” and “Effects of local government act and 
administrative power”.  
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Figure 2: Response rate surveys 2008 and 2013 (in pct.) 
 
In 2008, 64 percent (N=196) of the municipal secretaries have participated. In order to realize this 
response rate, respondents received one recall by e-mail and one by phone. In 2013, similar 
initiatives were undertaken to maximize the response rate. Conferences and forums of different 
umbrella organizations were used to convince respondents to participate. Furthermore, three recalls 
were sent by e-mail and during October 2013, all the secretaries were contacted telephonically. 
Despite these efforts, the response rate remains rather low (38%, N=116). The timing of the survey 
may be an explanation, as a number of secretaries possibly gave priority to the realization of their 
organizations first multi-annual budget in line with the stipulations of the PMC-Order. 
In order to evaluate the representativeness of both datasets, the extent to which the participating 
municipalities are a faithful reflection of the 308 Flemish municipalities was investigated. Both 
datasets are representative by municipality size and province. Furthermore, the data of 2013 is also 
representative with respect to the year in which the PMC-Order is implemented and to the socio-
economic profile (Dessoy, 2007).  
Besides the survey data, two other data sources were used: the database “Digital reporting” from the 
Flemish government was used to gather data on the number of policy objectives added to the multi-
annual plans.24 The database “Local statistics” provided data concerning some municipalities’ 
characteristics.25 Based on these sources, we operationalized the dependent variable as well as the 
aforementioned meso and micro variables. We discuss these characteristics in detail in the following 
section.  
1. Dependent variable: the role of the MT in the policy cycle  
As discussed, the Municipal Decree foresees in an essential role for the administration in the policy 
cycle. Although politicians remain responsible to make policy choices and to direct their 
governments, the municipal secretary and the local departments steer the policy cycle in the 
preparation, execution and the evaluation of the local policy. The MT supports the coördination of 
the local administration in the execution of these tasks. In order to investigate to what extent the 
local MT’s accomplish these tasks, we asked the secretaries in 2008 and 2013 to indicate on a five-
point Likert-scale to what extent they agreed with the following propositions:  
- The MT plays an important role in policy preparation; 
- The MT plays an important role in policy execution; 
                                                          
24 Ministerial Order concerning the digital reporting of data about the policy and management cycle of municipalities, provinces and public 
social welfare centers (BS 19/07/2013). 
25 On the website http://www.lokalestatistieken.be official statistics concerning the Flemish municipalities’ general administration and 
different policy domains are collected since 2005.  
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- The MT plays an important role in policy evaluation. 
 
Table 3: Perceived influence management teams (in pct.) 
 Preparation Execution Evaluation 
 2008 2013 2008 2013 2008 2013 
% (Totally) disagree 16,9 17,2 12,7 12,0 28,0 18,1 
% Neither agree nor disagree 17,5 9,5 25,4 16,4 26,5 27,6 
% (Totally) agree 65,7 73,3 61,9 71,6 45,5 54,3 
N 189 116 189 116 189 116 
Chi
2 
NS NS NS 
 
Especially during policy preparation, MT’s have a certain influence: almost three-fourths of the 
municipal secretaries believe that MT’s play an important role in this phase of the policy cycle. Less 
than one in five disagree with this proposition. In comparison with 2008, a positive evolution can be 
identified: at that time two-thirds of the respondents considered the MT’s role important during 
policy preparation. However, this evolution can not be considered significant. Furthermore, more 
than seven out of ten secretaries ascribe an important role to the MT in the execution of policy 
(compared with six out of ten in 2008). Approximately 12 percent (totally) disagrees with the 
proposition. The MT’s influence in the evaluation of the policy seems to be more delicate, both in 
2008 and in 2013. The MT’s involvement during policy evaluation is less obvious. While in 2008, 46 
percent of the secretaries believed the MT to play a decisive role during this phase, this percentage 
increased to 54 percent in 2013. In addition, the number of secretaries that consider the MT’s role in 
the policy evaluation as not important, decreases with almost 10 percent. Although perceptions 
concerning the MT’s role in the policy evaluation seem to be evolving in a positive direction, a chi 
square analysis shows that the perceived differences between both measurements are not 
significant on the .1-level. A possible explanation for this finding may be the rather low response rate 
in 2013 compared to 2008.  
Different reasons can explain the restraint vis-à-vis the administration’s involvement in this phase of 
the policy cycle. When it comes to policy evaluation in the Flemish municipalities, any official 
responsibility is relatively new. A study on the role behaviour of municipal secretaries of Plees and 
Laurent (1998) confirms this: the involvement of secretaries in policy evaluation was not discussed at 
all when the authors published their findings in 1998. Besides, policy evaluation takes a pivotal 
position in the political-administrative relationships. In general, both the administration, politicians, 
public opinion and media are involved (Bressers, 2008). As a consequence, the interpretation can 
differ according to the different stakeholders’ agendas (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Further, 
comparative research concludes that the policy influence of Flemish local top administrators is 
limited in comparison with their colleagues in other Western European countries (Van Gool, 2004). 
Another possible explanation is the restricted presence of a firm culture of policy evaluation in the 
Flemish municipalities: less than a third of the municipal secretaries and treasurers indicates the 
presence of an internal policy evalation. For external policy evaluations, this percentage lowers to 
15% (Bleyen & Bouckaert, 2014). Having this in mind, our findings concerning the MT’s involvement 
in the policy evaluation are quite optimistic. This may be due to social desirability of the answers or 
to an extended interpretation of the concept of policy evaluation.  
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In order to assess to what extent the questions of this dependent variable measure a common 
dimension, both factor and reliability analyses are performed (Table 4). The analyses show that the 
different questions form a reliable scale, both in 2008 and 2013. As a consequence, these variables 
are combined into a scale which describes the MT’s role in the policy cycle. A higher score implies a 
higher perceived role of the MT in the policy cycle. 
Table 4. Factor- and reliability analysis concerning the MT’s role in the policy cycle  
 
Preparation Execution Evaluation EigenValue Expl. Variance 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
2008 0,886 0,806 0,863 2,179 72,63 0,811 
2013 0,918 0,876 0,851 2,335 77,83 0,857 
 
2. Municipal context variables  
The variable political (dis)continuity (MC1) is be operationalized by using three categories, namely 
‘different coalition and mayor’ (0); ‘different coalition or different mayor’ (1) and ‘unchanged 
coalition and mayor’ (2). For the 2008 data, results of the local elections of 2006 are used. The results 
of 2012 are used as starting point for the 2013 analysis.  
As discussed above, previous research on the impact of the municipalities’ financial prospects (MC2) 
on success of reforms is not univocal. As a consequence, the local financial situation is 
operationalized differently: the municipalities’ debt ratio, which was used in the precedent study is 
replaced by a new ratio, the so called ‘autofinancieringsmarge’. While the former gives an overview 
of the debt/income ratio of the municipality, the latter takes the financial basis into account as well. 
In particular, the capacity of municipalities to contract supplementary (loan) expenses for new 
investments during the next legislature are calculated. Important, this variable is based on estimates 
for the recently started legislature. This is not the case for the data concerning the legislature 2007-
2012, which are based on the municipalities’ annual accounts.  
As for the variable municipal population (MC3), official population statistics were used. Data 
concerning the composition of the majority (MC4) are based on a database of the Flemish 
Government. 
3. Municipal organizational culture variables  
A. Political-administrative culture  
In order to portray the local politico-administrative relations, Flemish municipal secretaries were 
asked to what extent the management team model (OC1) was introduced in their municipality. As 
such, respondents needed to indicate to what extent they agreed with the following propositions:  
- I enjoy the confidence of the members of the college of mayor and aldermen. They give me 
complete freedom for the organization and coordination of the municipal services;  
- the members of the college of mayor and aldermen leave the preparation of decisions of the 
municipal council and the college to me and my services;  
- the members of the college of mayor and aldermen only establish the policy outlines, the 
administration decides on the policy execution;  
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- the members of the college of mayor and aldermen give the personnel a maximal rein in the 
policy preparation and execution.26  
Factor and reliability analyses show that the four propositions measure a common dimension, both 
in 2008 and 2013.27 A higher score means a more far-reaching implementation of the management 
team model. 
The operationalization of the perceived importance of the note of agreement (OC2) is conducted by 
asking the secretaries to what extent they believe the note of agreement to play an important role in 
the cooperation between college and MT on a five-point Likert-scale ranging from ‘totally disagree’ 
to ‘totally agree’.  
B. Result-oriented culture 
The extent to which municipalities are likely to the delegation of budgets (OC3) from the college to 
the secretary and from the secretary to the personnel, was surveyed by three propositions which 
gauged to the extent in which secretaries wish that… 
- the college of mayor and aldermen delegate budgets for affairs of daily management to the 
municipal secretary;  
- the municipal secretary delegates budgets for affairs of daily management and activity 
centers to other staff members;  
- the college of mayor and aldermen delegates budgets of daily management, activity centers 
or projects to other staff members, also for matters which exceed daily management.  
 
Again, factor and reliability analyses show that these propositions measure a common dimension in 
2008 and 2013.28 A higher scale score implies a more open attitude towards the instrument. 
Perceptions about the multi annual plan (OC4) are operationalized by the following propositions:  
- Working with a multi annual plan is too complicated for my municipality;  
- A multi annual plan hinders a flexible policy;  
- A multi annual plan is especially supported by the administration and less by politicians.  
 
Both in 2008 and 2013, these propositions constitute a reliable scale.29 A higher score on the scale 
implies a more positive evaluation of the multi annual plan.  
Result-oriented planning and budgeting practices are operationalized by means of the following 
variables. Given the recent nature of the innovation, this paper only focused on variables related to 
the first phase of the policy cycle. First, the number of policy objectives (OC5a) formulated in the 
multi-annual budgets are analyzed. Data are compiled by means of the Database Digital Reporting of 
the Flemish Government. Second, eight propositions measuring perceptions on the development of 
result-oriented management (OC5b) were put together in a scale. More specifically, the municipal 
secretaries were asked to what extent the following activities are developed in their municipality: (1) 
definition of a clear vision, (2) conducting an analysis of the environment preceding the preparation 
                                                          
26 These propositions are based on Plees & De Leemans (1997). 
27 Data 2008 (EigenValue: 2,795; Explained Variance: 69,874; Cronbachs Alpha: 0,855); Data 2013 (EigenValue: 2,639; Explained Variance: 
65,971; Cronbachs Alpha: 0,827).  
28 Data 2008 (EigenValue: 2,139; Explained Variance: 71,301; Cronbachs Alpha: 0,795). Data 2013 (EigenValue: 2,155; Explained Variance: 
71,820; Cronbachs Alpha: 0,826). 
29 Data 2008 (EigenValue: 1,718; Explained Variance: 57,274; Cronbachs Alpha: 0,606). Data 2013 (EigenValue: 1,982; Explained Variance: 
66,061; Cronbachs Alpha: 0,740). 
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of multi-annual budgets, (3) definition of the results and effects to be achieved, (4) formulation of 
policy objectives, (5) formulation of action plans and actions, (6) allocation of revenues and 
expenses, (7) the definition of performance measures and (8) the development of a monitoring 
system.30 Factor and reliability analyses prove the different variables to make up a reliable scale.31  
Furthermore, attitude towards the introduction of an MT (OC6a) and the PMC-reform (OC6b) is 
included in the analysis. If municipalities have introduced an MT and/or the PMC-reform before legal 
obligation, they are considered to be motivated to a larger extent to implement such reforms. 
Finally, the MT’s involvement in the development of the multi-annual budget (OC7) is added to the 
model. For the operationalization of this variable, respondents were asked to assess the MT’s role in 
this process.  
4. Individual characteristics of the muncipal secretaries  
As the MT’s chairman, the secretary may have an influence on the strength and functioning of the 
body. As a consequence, some of the secretaries’ personal characteristics are included in the 
analyses. Experience (ICS1) of the secretaries is a first variable. Specifically, the respondents are 
asked the number of years they performed their job.  
Furthermore, the secretaries’ involvement in the realization of the strategic multi-annual budget 
(ICS2) is considered in the regression analysis. By means of a five-point Likert-scale, they were asked 
to what extent they are involved in the development of the multi-annual budget. This proposition 
will only be included for the 2013 dataset.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF THE MT’S POSITION IN THE POLICY CYCLE  
The validity of the discussed hypotheses will be tested by means of a linear regression model in 
which we include successively the individual characteristics, the municipal variables and the variables 
concerning the organization culture. In order to guarantee comparability of the data, the variables 
are identical for both measurements. An exception is made for the variable that outlines the 
secretaries’ involvement in the realization of the multi-annual plan. Since this variable is only 
available for 2013, it will be included in a supplementary step of the analysis. In order to map out the 
PMC’s influence on the MT’s strength, some PMC variables are included for the data of 2013 in a 
third step. The results are presented in the following table.   
                                                          
30 Art. 6 & PMC Order; Art. 9 Min. Order PMC; Report to the Flemish Government added by the PMC-Order, 10/0705/0382, 21-67. 
31 EigenValue: 5,372; Explained Variance: 67,15; Cronbachs Alpha: 0,929. 
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Table 5: Linear regression analysis of the MT’s influence in the policy cycle – 2008 & 2013 
 
2008 2013 
   Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
 
Std. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
Std. Coeff. 
Std. 
Error 
(Constant) 
 
1,373 
 
1,118 
 
1,418 
 
1,724 
Individual characteristics 
Experience -0,045 0,022 -0,197** 0,025 -0,194** 0,025 -0,297*** 0,024 
Municipal context  
Continuity -0,134* 0,280 -0,144 0,358 -0,105 0,360 -0,065 0,337 
Financial profile (ref.: 
AFM ≤ 1) 
-0,067 0,686 -0,161* 0,533 -0,148 0,528 -0,118 0,502 
Population size 0,126 0,000 -0,005 0,000 -0,013 0,000 -0,103 0,000 
Majority’s 
composition  (ref.: 
coalition) 
0,020 0,453 0,060 0,607 0,045 0,601 0,043 0,565 
Political-administrative culture 
Management team 
model 
0,372*** 0,061 0,260** 0,075 0,233** 0,075 0,236*** 0,073 
Importance note of 
agreement 
0,264*** 0,187 0,182* 0,245 0,181* 0,242 0,179* 0,227 
Result-oriented culture 
Delegation of budgets  -0,031 0,070 0,137 0,067 0,112 0,067 0,109 0,063 
Perception MAP 0,165** 0,088 0,220** 0,063 0,172* 0,065 0,079 0,063 
Introduction MT (ref: 
after 2007) 
0,076 0,424 -0,010 0,468 0,016 0,467 -0,076 0,456 
Involvement secretary 
in MAP     
0,176* 0,283 -0,150 0,353 
Implementation PMC 
      
0,049 0,286 
Number of policy 
objectives       
0,176* 0,020 
Development PMC 
      
0,126 0,040 
Involvement MT in 
MAP       
0,449*** 0,312 
         
Adjusted R Square 0,275 0,260 0,278 0,392 
*p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
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Our analyses show a significant influence of the politico-administrative culture on the MT’s strength 
in the Flemish municipalities. Both in 2008 and 2013, the MT’s role is estimated more important in 
those municipalities where the organization is streamlined according to the management team 
model. Besides, a positive correlation is found between the MT’s position and the perceived 
importance of the note of agreement: as secretaries consider this note to be more important for the 
politico-administrative cooperation, they attribute higher influence to the MT.  
The impact of the municipal secretary’s experience is only found in 2013: more experienced 
secretaries circumscribe the MT as less powerful. Furthermore, the secretary’s involvement in the 
development of the multi-annual budget is significantly correlated with the MT’s influence in 2013: 
the perceived power of the MT increases with the secretary’s involvement.  
Neither in 2008 nor in 2013, the municipal characteristics strongly influence the MT’s perceived role. 
In 2008 the political stability was the only municipal characteristic with a significant influence: in 
those municipalities where the local elections of 2006 led to shifts in the composition of the 
coalitions and/or the mayor, the MT’s role was considered more important. This correlation doesn’t 
persist in 2013. Nevertheless, at the most recent measurement, there is a significant impact of the 
municipality’s financial profile. As the financial situation is more rose-colored, the MT plays a more 
important role according to the respondents. However, this correlation disappears as soon as the 
secretary’s involvement in the development of the multi-annual plan is included in the analysis.  
The extent of result orientation influences the MT’s power. Both measurements demonstrate a 
positive correlation between the perceptions about the multi annual plan and the MT’s influence. For 
the 2013 dataset, this relationship disappears after the introduction of the variables concerning the 
PMC Order. With regard to these latter variables, we find a positive correlation with the number of 
formulated policy objectives. In line with the formulated hypothesis, MT’s play a more important role 
according to the respondents when more policy objectives are formulated in the multi-annual plan 
rises.  
As MT’s are more involved in the realization of the multi-annual plan, the organ’s impact on the 
policy cycle increases in the eyes of the secretaries. Moreover, the adjusted chi square increases to 
39% after the introduction of variables concerning the PMC Order. The adjusted chi square of the 
common variables fluctuates around 27%, both in 2008 and 2013.  
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
This contribution investigated the interference between two NPM inspired reforms that were 
introduced in the Flemish municipalities: the introduction of management teams and the 
modernization of result-oriented financial management and strategic management. More 
specifically, the influence of the reforms of the PMC Order on the MT’s perceived power was 
investigated. In order to answer the research question, two surveys - executed by the secretaries in 
2008 and 2013 - served as a starting point. For both measurements the impact of the municipality’s 
secretary’s profile, the municipal context and the organization culture were evaluated. The influence 
of PMC reforms on the MT’s strength is tested for 2013 by adding some specific PMC Order related 
variables.  
First of all, the municipal organization culture strongly influences the MT’s power: as the 
municipality’s functioning is highly streamlined to the management team model, MT’s are able to 
wield more influence on the municipal policy. Furthermore, the perceived influence of the note of 
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agreements is correlated positively with the political-administrative cooperation and the MT’s role. 
Besides, the perceptions with respect to the multi annual plan exert a significant influence: 
respondents who evaluate the plans more positively, ascribe a more important role to the MT’s in 
the policy cycle. These conclusions apply both for 2008 and 2013.  
On the contrary, the influence of the secretary’s profile is only significant in 2013. Both the 
hypotheses on the experience and the involvement in the realization of the multi-annual plan, are 
confirmed. Due to methodological limitations, the number of analyzed individual characteristics 
remains limited. In further research, this lacuna may be filled by including more personal 
characteristics in the  model.  
Next, the analyses point to a limited contribution of contextual characteristics. While in 2008 only 
the political stability was correlated with the perceived influence of MT’s, for 2013 there’s a 
connection with the municipality’s financial situation. This positive correlation contradicts with 
previous, comparable research of Hennau et al (2013), but is in line with other studies concerning 
institutional reforms. Possibly the nature of the financial ratio that has been tested, is of importance. 
However, this ratio only influences the MT’s power in 2013. This could be a consequense of the 
different calculation of the ratio in 2008 and 2013: while the variable for the present legislature was 
based on the annual accounts’ estimates, the actual numbers were the starting point of the 2008 
calculations. Besides, the Flemish municipalities’ changing financial situation, which was sketched out 
by Leroy (2013), may have had an influence. Future research may take a closer and more in depth 
look to this variable.   
Since the MT’s role is not influenced by the municipalities’ population size, this contribution nuances 
the importance of scale for the success of this kind of institutional reforms. Different studies confirm 
this finding. Ackaert (1996) for example states that the ideal scale for the maximisation of 
administration power does not exist. The so called Bestuurskrachtmeting for rural villages confirms 
this conclusion by demonstrating that rural villages - which traditionally count less inhabitants - not 
necessarily are inefficient or ineffective (De Peuter et al., 2012) Besides, the swings in the local 
political landscape after the local elections of 2012 do not seem to have an impact on the MT’s 
functioning. The analyses suggest a positive influence of PMC related variables on the MT’s role in 
the policy cycle. As expected we found a positive correlation with the quantitative development of 
PMC and the MT’s involvement in the realization of the multi annual plans. Moreover the 
explanatory power of the model increases sharply after the introduction of the PMC related 
variables. However, neither the development of PMC nor the year of implementing the PMC Order 
seem to have an impact on the MT’s role.  
A final remark concerns the variables used for the operationalization of the prevailing organization 
culture. They are almost exclusively based on perceptions of the secretaries. As a consequence, a 
careful interpretation is of great importance. First , social desirability and the rationalization of one’s 
own behavior may have influenced the answering behavior of the respondents. Second, the opinions 
of other important actors can differ significantly. For future research, it is recommendable to 
introduce characteristics which depend less on the municipal secretaries’ perceptions. Moreover, 
data of other MT members, heads of department, top administrators or politicians can be an 
interesting supplement to the collected data material and can put the MT’s meaning, quality and role 
in a different light.   
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